icbnet

This work proposes a radio resource management framework employing game theoretic concepts for orthogonal frequency division multiple access, the most prevalent multiple access technique for the next generation wireless networks. The subcarrier allocation problem is encountered as a combinatorial auction, where the base station auctions the subcarriers and the users bid for and buy bundles of subcarriers, aiming at minimising their required transmit power. Subsequently, each allocated subcarrier is loaded with a number of bits, decided by each user independently, and the power control process is set up as a non-cooperative game. Each user responds to the interference sensed in his environment and, through a best responses process, the game converges to the unique, Pareto optimal, Nash equilibrium. In order to guarantee convergence, a limit is imposed to the maximum modulation level for each subcarrier. Simulation results show that the auction algorithm follows closely the performance of the optimal algorithm, whereas it is of lower computational complexity and requires less feedback information. Similarly, the proposed distributed bit loading and power control scheme achieves lower transmit power per offered bit rate unit. However, the distributed nature of the algorithm results in lower total offered bit rate, because of the partial knowledge and exploitation of channel state information.